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We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product
differentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be
observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition the elasticity of demand
(resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium.
When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and
the number of firms. We find that price marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in
a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with
concentration.
1. Introduction
One of themost robust findings of Industrial Organization theory is
that market equilibrium very often yields inefficient allocations. But
how large are these inefficiencies? This topic has inspired a con
siderable amount of empirical research, from the paper by Harberger
(1954) to the work of Cowling and Mueller (1978), among many
others.
In contrast, the theoretical literature is sparse and focuses on the
case of homogeneous products. In that case, when demand and costs
are linear and firms are identical, it is well known that the percentage
of welfare losses (PWL) in a Cournot Equilibrium is
1
1 + nð Þ2 where n is
the number of firms. McHardy (2000) showed that when demand is
quadratic, welfare losses can be 30% larger than in the linear model.
Anderson and Renault (2003) calculated PWL for a more general class
of demand functions. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) showed that if
average costs are not increasing and the inverse demand function is
concave, PWL is less than 1
2n + 1
. Finally, Corchón (2008) offered
formulae for PWL under free entry and heterogeneous firms. He
showed that PWL can be very large under these conditions. The only
paper dealing with heterogeneous products is by Cable et al. (1994),
who studied a linear duopoly model.
In this paper we analyze PWL in two models of imperfect
competition with heterogeneous products and a representative
consumer with quasi linear preferences: a model with linear demand
functions, as per Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), and amodel
with isoelastic demand functions, as per Spence (1976). In both
models, firms produce under constant average costs.
Our first step is to find PWL as a function of the fundamentals, i.e.,
the parameters of the demand and cost functions. As these parameters
cannot be observed, our second step is to obtain PWL as a function of
observable variables: price, output, number of firms, etc. Where this is
not possible, we introduce items that might be estimated such as
elasticity of demand. The goal of our analysis is to study the impact of
observable variables on PWL.1 Even though PWL can be calculated
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directly from the data on a case by case basis, our approach pinpoints
the theoretical factors explaining PWL.
We first consider the model with linear demand. Assume that
firms and demand functions are identical. We show that, given an
observation of price, output, marginal cost and the number of firms,
there exist parameters of the demand function that convert this
observation into a Cournot or a Bertrand equilibrium such that PWL is
arbitrary (Propositions 1 and 2). This result shows that PWL is
unrelated to the differences among profit rates, contrary to Harber
ger's dictum: “The differences among these profit rates, as between
industries, give a broad indication of the extent of resource
malallocation” (op. cit. p. 79). In our model all firms have the same
rate of return on capital but PWL can be high. It seems that Harberger's
procedure picks up welfare losses stemming from the failure of
markets to equalize profit rates, and not welfare losses from
oligopolistic misallocation. The issues are related, but distinct.
Next we show that if the elasticity of demand can be estimated,
PWL in a Cournot equilibrium can be computed from observables
(Proposition 3). The elasticity of demand does not add any new
information in the case of a Bertrand equilibrium because it can be
obtained from the markup and the first order condition of profit
maximization. We show that if the cross elasticity of demand can be
estimated, PWL can be computed from observations (Proposition 5).
Finally, we study how PWL depends on these variables (Propositions 4
and 6). Some results are as expected, but others are not: PWL is
decreasing on the price marginal cost margins (often referred to as
the “monopoly index”, Lerner, 1934), for example, in both Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria.2 Another surprising result is that PWL increases
with the elasticity of demand in a Bertrand equilibrium. Why is this
so? Consider two markets, A and B, and let the price marginal cost
margin be larger in A than in B. This means that the triangle that
represents welfare losses is larger in A than in B. However, the realized
welfare is also larger in A than in B because the demand function in A
is above the demand function in B. A priori, there is no good reason to
expect that one effect is larger than the other. In fact, as we noted
before, when costs and demand are linear and firms are identical,
these two effects cancel each other out and PWL only depends on the
number of firms.3 The same argument goes for demand elasticity: a
larger demand elasticity means less welfare losses and less realized
welfare, so the total effect is ambiguous.
Next we introduce heterogeneity in demand and costs. We focus
on the relationship between concentration and welfare losses. Some
papers have found that the Hirschman Herfindahl (H) index of
concentration is not a good measure of welfare losses. Daughety
(1990) came to this conclusion because more concentration may be
associated with a larger output in a leader follower equilibrium. In
papers by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Cable et al. (1994) and Corchón
(2008), the same result was related to the fact that the firms could be
of different sizes.4 This finding contrasts with the 1992 Merger
Guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where H is
considered a reasonable measure of welfare losses (Coate, 2005). We
show that when it is optimal to allow all firms to produce, PWL
increases with H in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria (Proposi
tion 7). This case arises when goods are poor substitutes. We also
show that when it is optimal to allow only one firm to produce, PWL
decreases with H. This is what happened in the papers cited above
where products are perfect substitutes.
Thus, we find that concentration is bad (good) for welfare when
goods are poor (good) substitutes. The reason is that efficient
production must balance cost savings against consumer satisfaction.
The former favors concentrating production in themost efficient firms,
while the lattermay require considerable diversification of production.
If the last effect is not very large (i.e., when the products are close
substitutes), cost savings drive efficiency and thus concentration does
not harm efficiency. If the products are poor substitutes, however,
efficient production requires output dispersion so concentration is
harmful. We also show that at the value of H proposed by the FTC as a
threshold for a concentrated industry, PWL is large in a Cournot
equilibrium but may be small in a Bertrand equilibrium.5
In Section 3 we assume that the representative consumer has
preferences representable by a CES utility function. We also assume a
large number of identical firms. This model (Spence, 1976) and its
variants (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) are popular in the fields of
monopolistic competition, international trade, geography and eco
nomics. We depart from these models, however, by assuming that the
number of firms is exogenous. The reason for this difference is that to
endogenize the number of firms we need fixed costs, which may
produce large PWL (Corchón, 2008). Since in this paper we want to
focus on the PWL produced by product heterogeneity, we must
assume that the number of firms is given. We show that PWL tends to
zero as demand elasticity tends to infinity, and that PWL tends to one
as the degree of homogeneity of the CES function tends to one
(Proposition 8). This result qualifies a conjecture of Stigler (1949): “...
the predictions of this standard model of imperfect competition differ
only in unimportant respects from those of the theory of competition
because the underlying conditions will usually be accompanied by
very high demand elasticities for the individual firms”. Although a
high elasticity of demand makes PWL small in this model, given any
elasticity of demand we can obtain a PWL as close to one as we wish.
Next, we show that PWL can be recovered from an observation of
the price, output, marginal cost and number of firms (Proposition 9).
However, a low price marginal cost margin does not guarantee that
PWL is small; even if the price tends to the marginal cost, when the
number of firms is sufficiently large, PWLmay exceed that obtained in
a linear model under monopoly. Moreover, when the number of firms
tends to infinity, PWL is decreasing in the price marginal cost margin
(Proposition 10). This is another case where price marginal cost
margins and welfare losses are not related in the way we had
previously thought.
Summing up, we have three main conclusions. First, our main
message is positive: obtaining PWL from data is possible in two well
known models of imperfect competition. Second, the roles of rates of
returns, markups and the elasticity of demand on PWL are not always
what they have been thought to be. Finally, we explain the role of the
H index. Our formulae unify previous views on the role of elasticities,
markups and concentration in a precise way, with results that may be
useful for policy making.
2. The linear model
In this section we assume that inverse demand is linear and that
goods are substitutes.6 In the first subsection we assume that all firms
are identical, which allows for clean formulae of welfare losses. In the
second subsectionwe study the case where costs and the intercepts of
inverse demands vary among firms. The resulting formulae for PWL
will then be used to discuss the role of concentration in oligopolistic
markets.
2 This was noted by Formby and Layson (1982) in the case of monopoly.
3 In other words, price–marginal cost margins do not control for the size of demand.
Thus, a high margin might indicate either that demand is very large and firms are
having good times–even if they are very competitive–or that firms are qexploitingq
consumers and destroying a large part of the surplus. This is true even if actual
production is known, because the price-marginal cost margin is a poor indicator of
efficient production.
4 The point that minor firms may be harmful for welfare was first made by Lahiri and
Ono (1988).
5 Despite the fact that, as shown by Amir and Jin (2001), H is always higher in a
Bertrand equilibrium than in a Cournot equilibrium.
6 We study the case of complements in a companion working paper (Corchón and
Zudenkova, 2008).
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2.1. The symmetric case
The market is composed of n firms. The output and price of firm i
are denoted by xi and pi respectively. The firms are identical, sharing
the cost function cxi. There is a representative consumer with a
quadratic utility function
U = α
Xn
i 1
xi
β
2
Xn
i 1
x2i
γ
2
Xn
i 1
xi
X
j ≠ i
xj + M; α N c; β N γz0;
whereM is the consumption of an outside good which is the numeraire.
The budget constraint is∑i 1n pixi+M= I, where I is a given income.
Substituting M into U and eliminating I (which is constant), we obtain
U = α
Pn
i 1 xi
β
2
Pn
i 1 x
2
i
γ
2
Pn
i 1 xi
P
j ≠ i xj
Pn
i 1 pixi.We
call this quantity the consumer surplus. Under our assumptions, this
function is concave. The first order condition (FOC) of consumer surplus
maximization yields pi=α βxi γ∑j≠i xj, i=1,2…,n. If γ=0 the
products are independent, while if γ≃β they are almost perfect
substitutes.
Definition 1. A linear market is a list {α,β,γ,c,n} with αNc, βNγ≥0 and
n∈ℕ.
Social welfare is defined as
W = α
Xn
i 1
xi
β
2
Xn
i 1
x2i
γ
2
Xn
i 1
xi
X
j ≠ i
xj c
Xn
i 1
xi: ð2:1Þ
The social optimum is a list of outputs that maximize social
welfare. It is easy to see that the optimal outputs xio (which are all
identical) and the social welfare in the optimum Wo are
xoi =
α c
β + γ n 1ð Þ and W
o =
n α cð Þ2
2 β + n 1ð Þγð Þ :
Now we are ready to define our equilibrium concepts.
Definition 2. A Cournot equilibrium in a linear market is a list of outputs
(x1c, x2c,…, xnc) such that for each i, xic maximizes (α βxi γ∑j≠i xjc c)xi.
From the FOC of profit maximization we find that
xci =
α c
2β + γ n 1ð Þ ; i = 1;2; N ;n: ð2:2Þ
In order to define a Bertrand equilibriumwe write the demand for
firm i:
xi =
α β γð Þ pi β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ + γ
P
j ≠ i pj
β γð Þ β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ
uxbi pi;p ið Þ; i = 1;2; N ;n;
ð2:3Þ
where p− i is a list of all prices minus pi. Nowwe can define a Bertrand
equilibrium.
Definition 3. A Bertrand equilibrium in a linear market is a list of prices
(p1b, p2b,…, pnb) such that for each i, pib maximizes (pi c)xib(pi, p− ib ).
From the FOC of profit maximization we obtain
pbi =
α β γð Þ + c β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ
2β + γ n 3ð Þ ; i = 1;2; N ;n: ð2:4Þ
Let Wc be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium. Let
us define the percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium as
PWLcu
Wo Wc
Wo
:
Lemma 1. In linear markets the percentage of welfare losses in Cournot
equilibrium is
PWLc =
1
2 + n 1ð Þγ
β
 2
Proof. From (2.1), social welfare in a Cournot equilibrium can be
written as Wc = αnxci
β
2
nxc2i
γ
2
n n 1ð Þxc2i cnxci . Thus, from
(2.2) we obtain
Wc =
n α cð Þ2 3β + n 1ð Þγð Þ
2 2β + n 1ð Þγð Þ2 :
Then,
PWLc = 1
Wc
Wo
=
1
2 + n 1ð Þγ
β
 2 : □
Notice that PWLc is decreasing in the degree of product dif
ferentiation, γ
β
. Thus, the minimal PWLc is
1
n + 1ð Þ2 and occurs when γ≃β,
i.e., when the products are perfect substitutes. The maximal PWLc is
equal to 0.25 and occurs for theminimal value of γ
β
, which is zerowhen
products are independent.
The following Lemma derives PWLb, the percentage of welfare
losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In linear markets the percentage of welfare losses in Bertrand
equilibrium is
PWLb =
1 γ
β
2 + n 3ð Þγ
β
 !2
: ð2:5Þ
Proof. From (2.4) we find that all firms produce the same output xib,
namely
xbi =
α cð Þ β + n 2ð Þγð Þ
2β + n 3ð Þγð Þ β + n 1ð Þγð Þ :
Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium is Wb = αnxbi
β
2
nxb2i
γ
2
n n 1ð Þxb2i cnxbi , or
Wb =
n α cð Þ2 3β + n 4ð Þγð Þ β + n 2ð Þγð Þ
2 2β + n 3ð Þγð Þ2 β + n 1ð Þγð Þ :
Thus,
PWLb = 1
Wb
Wo
=
1 γ
β
2 + n 3ð Þγ
β
 !2
: □
Note that PWLb is decreasing in the degree of product differentia
tion γ
β
Thus, minimal PWLb is (almost) zero and occurs when γ≃β, i.e.,
when the products are perfect substitutes. Maximal PWLb is equal to
0.25 and occurs for γ
β
= 0, when products are independent. Clearly, if
n=1, PWLj=0.25, j=c,b, so for the remainder of this section we will
assume that nN1.
We are interested in the PWL yielded by imperfectly competitive
markets, conditional on certain observable variables: market prices,
outputs, marginal cost, and the number of firms. We assume that the
marginal cost is observable because under constant returns, the
marginal cost equals the average variable cost, which in principle can
be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Formally:
Definition 4. An observation is a list p; xi; c;nf g where p is the market
price, xi is the output of firm i, c (b p) is the marginal cost and n is the
number of firms.
Let us relate PWL to the observable variables. First consider the
Cournot equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. Given an observation p; xi; c;nf g and a number
v∈ 1
n + 1ð Þ2 ;0:25
 i
there is a linear market α;β;γ; c;nf g such that
xi; xi;ð N ; xiÞ is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, where
p = α βxi γ n 1ð Þxi and PWLc = v.
Proof. Let
α = c +
p c
v
p ;β = p c
xi
and γ =
p cð Þ 1 2 vp 
n 1ð Þxi v
p :
Clearly, α N c and β N γz0 since p N c; v N 1
n + 1ð Þ2
and vV0:25. We
easily see that the linear market α;β;γ; c;nf g yields an equilibrium
where xic=xi, i=1,2,…,n, p=α βxi γ(n 1)xi and PWLc=v, so
the proof is complete. □
Now we turn to the Bertrand equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Given an observation p; xi; c;nf g and a number v∈
(0,0.25] there is a linear market α;β;γ; c;nf g such that p;p; :::;pð Þ is a
Bertrand equilibrium for this market, xi = xbi p;p ið Þ, where p− i is a list
of n 1 identical p and PWLb=v.
Proof. Let
α = c +
p c
v
p ; β = p c
xi
v
p
1
 
1 + v
p
n 3ð Þ 
v + n v v
p  and
γ =
c p
xi
1 3 v
p
+ 2v
v + n v v
p  :
It is easy to check that 0bcbα and βNγ≥0. The linear market
α;β;γ; c;nf g yields a Bertrand equilibrium with pib=p, xib=xi and
PWLb=v, so the proof is complete. □
Propositions 1 and 2 show that observable variables put very few
restrictions on PWL. In particular, neither price marginal cost margins
nor profit rates have any relationship with PWL. Let us look for
restrictions that can take a bite out of PWL.7 Suppose that the demand
elasticity, denoted by ε, is observable. From (2.3), we have
eu
Axi
Api
p
xi
=
β + γ n 2ð Þ
β γð Þ β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ
p
xi
:
Let us introduce a new piece of notation: Tuep c
p
Now we have the
following result.
Proposition 3. Given an observation p; xi; c;n; ef g such that Tu
e p c
p
z1, there is a linear market α;β;γ; c;nf g such that xi; xi; N ; xið Þ
is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, p=α βxi γ(n 1)xi and
PWLc =
1
2 + T 1ð Þ n 2ð Þ + T 1ð Þ n
2T n 2ð Þ2 q
2T
 2 ð2:6Þ
Proof. Let
α = c +
p
2e
T n + 2ð Þ n 2ð Þ + T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q 
β =
p c
xi
γ =
T 1ð Þ n 2ð Þ + T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q
2T n 1ð Þ
p c
xi
:
Clearly, βN0. We need to show that 0 V γ
β
b 1 and α N c. For T≥1 the
square root is defined in real numbers and T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q z
T 1ð Þ n 2ð Þ because if not, n2 Tb(n 2)2T, which is impossible.
Then the condition 0 V γ
β
b 1 amounts to
0 V
T 1ð Þ n 2ð Þ + T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q
2T n 1ð Þ b 1Z4T n 1ð Þ
2
N 0;
which always holds for T∈[1,∞). The condition αNc amounts to
T 1ð Þ n 2ð Þ + T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2
 r
+ 4T N 0, which holds
for T ∈[1,∞). It is straightforward to show that the linear market
α;β;γ; c;nf g yields a Cournot equilibrium where xic=xi, p=α βx_
{i} γ(n 1)x_{i}, and PWLc as defined by (2.6). □
According to Proposition 3 we can calculate PWLc from three
variables: the number of firms, the elasticity of demand and the price
marginal cost ratio. Let us study how PWLc depends on n andT. Notice
that observable variables are not independent and that in general, a
variation in just one observable variable cannot be obtained by a
variation of a single unobservable variable (see the first three
equations of the proof of Proposition 3). Our exercise just gives us
the difference in PWL between two markets in which all observables
except one are identical. Thus, it emphasizes the role played by the
observables, which sometimes contradicts intuition.
Proposition 4. PWLc is decreasing in n, the elasticity of demand, and the
price marginal costs margins.
Proof. From (2.6) we find
APWLc
An
8T2 T 1 + 2 + n T 1ð Þð Þ T 1ð Þ
T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q
 
2 + n T 1ð Þ + 2T + T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q 3 b 0:
Next we compute
A
γ
β
 
AT
:
A
γ
β
 
AT
n 4 + n T 1ð Þ 2Tð Þ 2 2 Tð Þ + n 2ð Þ T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q
2 n 1ð ÞT2 T 1ð Þ n2T n 2ð Þ2 q
ð2:7Þ
This derivative is positive, so PWLc decreases with T. □
In Proposition 4, the signs of the effects of the number of firms and
demand elasticity are just as expected: more competition i.e., a
higher value of n or ε is good. However the effect of price marginal
cost margins runs counter to intuition. As we remarked in the
introduction, this is because the price marginal cost margin affects
both welfare losses and realized welfare.
Note that we have been applying comparative statics, treating the
observable variables n, ε and p cp as exogenous. This approach
provides policy makers with a tool to predict changes in PWL due to
changes in just one of the observables, taking all other variables as
given. If both demand elasticity and the price marginal cost margin
change, one needs to consider the comparative statics of PWL with
respect to the factor Tue p c
p
given in (2.7).
We now consider the Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, the FOC of
profit maximization can be written as pi=ε(pi c). Thus, an
observation of ε does not add any new information once pi and c are
observed. A way out of this problem is provided if the cross elasticity
of demand Axi
Apj
pj
xi
, denoted by ρ, is observable.
Proposition 5. Given an observation p; xi; c;n;ρf g such that pp c N
ρ n 1ð Þz0, there is a linear market α;β;γ; c;nf g such that p;p; :::;pð Þ
is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market, xi = xbi p;p ið Þ, where p− i is a
list of n 1 identical p and
PWLb =
p
p c
ρ n 1ð Þ
2 p
p c
ρ n 1ð Þ
 !2
: ð2:8Þ7 The maximum PWL in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria occurs when γ≃0,
namely PWL≃0.25, which corresponds to PWL under monopoly.
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Proof. Let
α = p +
p
p
p c
ρ n 1ð Þ
β =
p p
p c
ρ n 2ð Þ
 
xi
p
p c
+ ρ
 
p
p c
ρ n 1ð Þ
 
γ =
pρ
xi
p
p c
+ ρ
 
p
p c
ρ n 1ð Þ
 
It is straightforward to prove that αNc and βN0 and that βNγ≥0 for
p
p c
N ρ n 1ð Þz0. One can easily show that the linear market α;β;f
γ; c;ng yields a Bertrand equilibrium where pib=p and xib(p,p− i)=xi,
and find PWLb by plugging the values of β and γ in (2.5). □
The formula (2.8) allows for the calculation of PWL in a Bertrand
equilibrium from just three magnitudes: the number of firms, the
price marginal cost margins (or alternatively, the elasticity of
demand), and the cross elasticity of demand. Let us analyze the
impact of a change in observable variables on PWLb.
Proposition 6. PWLb is decreasing in the number of firms, the price
marginal cost margins, and the cross elasticity of demand. PWLb is
increasing in the elasticity of demand.
Proof. In a Bertrand equilibrium p
p c
= e. From (2.8), we therefore
obtain
APWLb
An
=
2eρ e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ
2e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ3 b 0;
APWLb
Ae
=
2 n 1ð Þρ e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ
2e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ3 N 0;
APWLb
Aρ
=
2 n 1ð Þe e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ
2e ρ n 1ð Þð Þ3 b 0:
From these formulae the proposition follows. □
Proposition 6 confirms our intuitions about the role of the number
of firms and the cross elasticity of demand on welfare losses, namely
that an increase in the number of firms decreases PWL and an increase
in the cross elasticity of demand decreases PWL. The impacts of the
price marginal cost margin and demand elasticity, on the other hand,
are contrary to intuition. Again, we have to bear in mind that these
two variables affect both welfare losses and realized welfare.
2.2. Heterogeneous firms
We now extend the model presented in Section 2.1 to the case
where firms are heterogeneous on two counts. The marginal costs ci
may be different for each firm i. The parameter α, now denoted αi,
may also vary across firms.8 Assume αiNci for all i. The consumer
surplus is now
U =
Xn
i 1
αixi
β
2
Xn
i 1
x2i
γ
2
Xn
i 1
xi
X
j ≠ i
xj
Xn
i 1
pixi;β N γz0
The restrictions below guarantee that the outputs of all firms are
positive in Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
2β + γ n 1ð ÞNγ
Pn
i 1 αi cið Þ
αi ci
; i = 1;2; N ;n: ð2:9Þ
β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ 2β + γ n 3ð Þð Þ
β + γ n 2ð Þ N
γ
Pn
i 1 αi cið Þ
αi ci
i = 1;2; N ;n:
ð2:10Þ
Under our assumptions, U(·) is concave. The FOC of consumer
surplus maximization yields pi=αi βxi γ∑j≠ ixj,i=1,2, …,n.
Social welfare is now
W =
Xn
i 1
αixi
β
2
Xn
i 1
x2i
γ
2
Xn
i 1
xi
X
j ≠ i
xj
Xn
i 1
cixi: ð2:11Þ
Evaluating social welfare in the optimum is not straightforward,
because it depends on the number of active firms in the optimum. For
the time being, let us assume that the optimal number of active firms
is m. Then the optimal outputs, denoted by xio, are equal to
xoi =
αi ci
β γ
γ
Pm
i 1
αi cið Þ
β + γ m 1ð Þð Þ β γð Þ ; i = 1;2; N ;m ð2:12Þ
and the aggregate output in the optimum, denoted by xo, is equal to
xo =
Xm
i 1
xoi =
Pm
i 1
αi cið Þ
β + γ m 1ð Þ
We now find the optimal number of firms m. Let us rank firms
according to the value of αi ci. Without loss of generality assume
that αv cv≥αv+1 cv+1, v=1,2,…,n 1. Clearly, if firm v produces
a positive output in the optimum, firms v 1, v 2, etc. also produce
positive outputs in the optimum. Suppose that it is optimal for firms 1
through k 1 to produce positive outputs. By evaluating AW
Axk
in (2.11) at
xk=0 and xj=xjo, j=1, …k 1 according to (2.12), we obtain
AW
Axk
= αk ck γ
Xk 1
j 1
xoj : ð2:13Þ
If AW
Axk
V 0, clearly, xko=0. If AW
Axk
N 0, firm kmust produce a positive output
in the optimum.
This algorithm requires knowledge of all the parameters defining a
market. In a companion working paper (Corchón and Zudenkova,
2008), we show that all these parameters can be recovered from
market data and demand elasticities by a method identical to that
applied in Propositions 3 and 5. We will focus on two particular cases.
First, when β(α2 c2)≤γ(α1 c1), only firm 1 will produce a positive
output in the optimum since from (2.12) and (2.13), AW
Ax2
= α2 c2
γα1 c1
β
V 0. Second, when
αn cnð Þ β + γ n 2ð Þð ÞN γ
Xn 1
i 1
αi cið Þ; ð2:14Þ
the number of active firms is the same in optimum and in equilibrium,
because from (2.12) and (2.13), AW
Axn
= αn cn γ
Pn 1
j 1 x
o
j N 0.
Notice that the conditions in (2.9) and (2.10) are implied by (2.14).
In this framework, a Cournot equilibrium is a list of outputs (x1c ,x2c ,
…, xnc) such that for each i, xic maximizes (αi βxi γ∑j≠ i xjc ci)xi.
From the FOC of profit maximization, we obtain
xci =
αi ci
2β γ
γ
2β γ
Pn
i 1
αi cið Þ
2β + γ n 1ð Þ :
8 This model has been used, among others, by Häckner (2000) and Hsu and Wang
(2005).
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And the aggregate output at the Cournot equilibrium is
xc =
Xn
i 1
xci =
Pn
i 1
αi cið Þ
2β + γ n 1ð Þ :
In order to compute a Bertrand equilibrium we first write the
demand for firm i:
xi =
αi β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ pi β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ γ
P
j ≠ i αj pj
 
β γð Þ β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ
uxbi pi; p ið Þ:
A Bertrand equilibrium is a list pb1; p
b
2; :::; p
b
n
 
such that for all i pbi
maximizes pi cið Þxbi pi;pb i
 
. Then we have
xbi =
β + γ n 2ð Þ
β γð Þ 2β + γ 2n 3ð Þð Þ
× αi ci γ
β + γ n 2ð Þ
2β + γ n 3ð Þð Þ β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ
Xn
i 1
αi cið Þ
 !
;
and the aggregate output at the Bertrand equilibrium is
xb =
β + γ n 2ð Þ
2β + γ n 3ð Þð Þ β + γ n 1ð Þð Þ
Xn
i 1
αi cið Þ:
Next, we link PWL to the Hirschman Herfindahl index of
concentration. Let s ij be the market share of firm i in a Cournot
equilibrium (j=c), a Bertrand equilibrium (j=b), or in the optimum
(j=o). We define the Hirschman Herfindahl index of concentration
in either equilibrium as Hj≡∑i 1n (si
j)2, j=c,b. In the optimum, we
define it as Ho≡∑i 1m (sio)2.9 Amir and Jin (2001) show that in our
framework HbNHc.
Lemma 3. With heterogeneous firms the percentage of welfare losses in
Cournot equilibrium is
PWLc = 1
1 + γ
β
m 1ð Þ
mγ
β
+ 2 γ
β
 Xm
i 1
sci
0
@
1
A2Hc 3 γβ
 
+ γ
β
Ho 1 γ
β
 
+ γ
β
: ð2:15Þ
Proof. Social welfare in a Cournot equilibrium, denoted by Wc, is
given by
Wc =
Xn
i 1
αi cið Þxci
β
2
Xn
i 1
xc2i
γ
2
Xn
i 1
xci
X
j ≠ i
xcj
=
3β γ
2
Hcxc2 +
γ
2
xc2
Using the definition of Ho, social welfare in the optimum is
Wo =
β γ
2
Hoxo2 +
γ
2
xo2:
Plugging the values of Wc and Wo into PWLc yields
PWLc = 1
Wc
Wo
= 1
xc
xo
 2Hc 3β γð Þ + γ
Ho β γð Þ + γ ;
while plugging in the values of xc and xo yields formula (2.15). □
Note that PWLc here depends on the degree of product differentia
tion γ
β
, the number of active firms in the optimum m, the sum of the
market shares of the m largest firms ∑i 1m sic, and the Hirschman
Herfindahl indices of concentration Hc and Ho evaluated at the
Cournot equilibrium and optimum respectively. Whenm=1 we have
PWLc m = 1ð Þ = 1
Hc 3 γ
β
 
+ γ
β
γ
β
+ 2 γ
β
 
sc1
 2 ;
which is decreasing in Hc. In the other extreme case wherem=n i.e.,
the number of active firms is the same in the optimum and at a
Cournot equilibrium we prove that
PWLc m nð Þ
Hc 1 + n 1ð Þγ
β
 
γ
β
Hc 2 γ
β
 2
1 + n 1ð Þγ
β
 
+ γ
β
 2
n 2 n 1ð Þγ
β
  :
ð2:16Þ
If all firms are identical, Hc = 1
n
and PWLc m = nð Þ = 1
2 + n 1ð Þγ
β
 2, as
in Lemma 1. Notice that Hc and γ
β
are less than one, so for reasonable
values of n it makes sense to evaluate (2.16) as if n were a large
number. In this case (2.16) simplifies to
PWLc m = n; n largeð Þ = H
c
Hc 2 γ
β
 2
+ γ
β
1 γ
β
  ; and
APWLc m = n; n largeð Þ
A
γ
β
=
Hc 1 2γ
β
2Hc 2 γ
β
  
Hc 2 γ
β
 2
+ γ
β
1 γ
β
  2 :
The latter is negative for γ
β
∈ 0; 1 4Hc
2 1 Hcð Þ
 
and positive for γ
β
∈
1 4Hc
2 1 Hcð Þ;1
 
. Thus, the minimum occurs at γ
β
= 1 4H
c
2 1 Hcð Þ When H
c=
0.18,which the FTC considers the threshold for a concentrated industry,
the minimal PWLc is 0.241967. This value is a large lower bound.
Now we consider welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In a Bertrand equilibrium with heterogeneous firms
PWLb=1
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
1 + γ
β
m 1ð Þ
 
mγ
β
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
+ 1 γ
β
 
2 + γ
β
2n 3ð Þ
 Pm
i 1 s
b
i
0
@
1
A
2
·
ð2:17Þ
Hb 1 γ
β
 
3 + γ
β
3n 4ð Þ
 
+ γ
β
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
Ho 1 γ
β
 
+ γ
β
 
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
Proof. Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium, denoted by Wb, is
given by
Wb =
β γð Þ 3β + γ 3n 4ð Þð Þ
2 β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ H
bxb2 +
γ
2
xb2:
LetPWLbbe thepercentage ofwelfare losses in aBertrandequilibrium.
PWLb 1
Wb
Wo
1
xb
xo
 !2
Hb β γð Þ 3β + γ 3n 4ð Þð Þ + γ β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ
Ho β γð Þ + γð Þ β + γ n 2ð Þð Þ
Plugging in the values of xb and xo, we obtain the formula above. □
Thus, PWLb depends on the degree of product differentiation γ
β
, the
number of active firms in the optimum m and in a Bertrand
equilibrium n, the sum of the market shares of the m largest firms
∑i 1m sib, and the Hirschman Herfindahl indices of concentration Hb
9 Notice that in our framework products can be imperfect substitutes, so
interpreting ∑i 1n (si)2 as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration may be
a bit problematic.
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and Ho, evaluated at a Bertrand equilibrium and in the optimum
respectively.
As before, let us consider two special cases. First, when in the
optimum only firm 1 is used by the planner. Thus, m=1 and
PWLb m = 1ð Þ = 1
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
γ
β
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
+ 1 γ
β
 
2 + γ
β
2n 3ð Þ
 
sb1
0
@
1
A2
×
Hb 1 γ
β
 
3 + γ
β
3n 4ð Þ
 
+ γ
β
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ :
For β≃γ, this formula reduces to PWLb(m=1)=0, as one expects
for a Bertrand equilibrium under product homogeneity. Notice that
PWLb(m=1) is decreasing in Hb. Second, when the number of active
firms is the same in the optimum and in a Bertrand equilibrium, after
lengthy calculations, we obtain the result
PWLb m nð Þ
Hb 1 + γ
β
n 1ð Þ
 
γ
β
 
1 γ
β
 
1 + γ
β
n 1ð Þ
 
Hb 1 γ
β
 
2 + γ
β
2n 3ð Þ
 2
+ γβ
 2
n 2 + γ
β
3 + n 3ð Þnð Þ
  :
ð2:18Þ
If all firms are identical, Hb 1n and PWL
b m nð Þ 1−
γ
β
2 + γβ n−3ð Þ
 2
as in Lemma 2. Finally, when n is large, (2.18) simplifies to
PWLb m = n; n largeð Þ =
Hb 1 γ
β
 
γ
β
+ 4Hb 1 γ
β
 
;
which is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation γβ. Its
maximal value is 0.25 (for γβ = 0). For H
b = 0:18; PWLb m =ð
n;n largeÞ = 0:18 0:18
γ
β
0:28γβ + 0:72
which for values of γβ larger than 0.75 is less
than 4.8%. So in this case a high concentration does not imply large
welfare losses.
From (2.16) and (2.18) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7. PWLj(m=n) is increasing in Hj, j=c,b.
Proof. Computing APWL
c
AHc
m = nð Þ, we obtain
γ
β
1 γ
β
 
1 + γ
β
n 1ð Þ
 
4 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
4Hc 1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
+ γ
β
 3
Hc 1ð Þ n 1ð Þ + γ
β
 2
n 2 + Hc 5 4nð Þð Þ
 2 ;
which is positive for γ
β
N 0. Also, APWL
b
AHb
m = nð Þ is equal to
γ
β
1 γ
β
 
1 + γ
β
n 1ð Þ
 
1 + γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
4 + 5γ
β
n 2ð Þ + γ
β
 2
6 + n 6ð Þnð Þ
 
4Hb 1 + 2γ
β
n 2ð Þ
 
+ γ
β
 3
3 Hb 3 2nð Þ2 + n 3ð Þn  + γ
β
 2
n 2 + Hb 21 + 4 n 5ð Þnð Þ  2;
which is positive for γβ N 0. □
Thus, for m=n PWL increases with H, contrary to what happens
when m=1 in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. This is because
the condition m=n (m=1) is related to goods being poor (good)
substitutes. Finally, a word of caution: in Proposition 7 we have
assumed that H is independent of all other variables affecting PWL, for
example γ
β
and n. But H does depend on these variables. Strictly
speaking, Proposition 7 only applies to variations in H that are caused
by variations in the α's and c's.
3. A model of a large group
In this section we consider the market for a differentiated good
supplied by a large number of firms. Typical examples include
restaurants, wine, beer, etc. We will not consider entry and fixed
costs, which as shown in Corchón (2008) might produce a very high
PWL and bias our estimates. As the purpose of this paper is to study
the impact of product differentiation alone, we discard these costs. As
we will see, even so this model is capable of producing a very high
PWL. The model can be interpreted as a monopolistic competition
model in which the long run aspects are not considered. In this
framework the relative size of firms is not an important issue, so we
will assume that all firms are identical. Also, for convenience, we will
assume that firms compete in quantities.
The consumer surplus is given by
U =
Xn
i 1
xδi
 !r
δ Xn
i 1
pixi; δ; r∈ 0;1ð Þ;
(see Spence, 1976). The inverse demand function of firm i is pi =
r
Pn
i 1 x
δ
i
 r
δ 1xδ 1i .
Definition 5. A CES market is a list δ; r; c;nf g with δ,r∈(0,1), cb0, and
n∈ℕ.
The profit function for firm i is πi = r
Pn
i 1 x
δ
i
 r
δ 1xδi cxi.
Because there are many firms, each firm takes∑i 1n xiδ as given. The
elasticity of demand, denoted by ε, is defined as the inverse of the
elasticity of inverse demand:
 =
1
1 δ
: ð3:1Þ
Thus, as δ→1 the elasticity of demand becomes infinite. Now we
have the following preliminary result.
Lemma 5. In a CES market
PWLs = 1 δ
1
1 r
1
δ
r
1 r
: ð3:2Þ
Proof. The FOC of profit maximization for firm i is
r
Xn
i 1
xδi
 !r
δ
1
δxδ 1i c = 0: ð3:3Þ
The left hand side of (3.3) is decreasing in xi, so the second order
condition holds. In a symmetric equilibrium where all firms produce
the same output, denoted by xi⁎, we have
x⁎i =
rδ
cn1
r
δ
 ! 1
1 r
; p⁎ =
c
δ
and U⁎ = n
r
δ
rδ
cn1
r
δ
 ! r
1 r
: ð3:4Þ
In this equilibrium, the social welfare is
W⁎ = n
r
δ
rδ
cn1
r
δ
 ! r
1 r
nc
rδ
cn1
r
δ
 ! 1
1 r
:
In the optimum the price equals the marginal cost. Thus,
r
Pn
i 1 x
δ
i
 r
δ 1xδ 1i = c. From this we get
xoi =
r
cn1
r
δ
 ! 1
1 r
and Wo = n
r
δ
r
cn1
r
δ
 ! r
1 r
nc
r
cn1
r
δ
 ! 1
1 r
; ð3:5Þ
where xio and Wo stand for the output and social welfare in the
optimum. Wo is increasing in n, so in the full optimum the planner
would choose a number of firms equal to n.
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Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses is:
PWLs 1
W⁎
Wo
1
n
r
δ rδ
cn1
r
δ
  r
1 r nc rδ
cn1
r
δ
  1
1 r
n
r
δ r
cn1
r
δ
  r
1 r nc r
cn1
r
δ
  1
1 r
= 1 δ
1
1 r
1
δ r
1 r
: □
At first glance it is surprising that PWLs does not depend on the
number of firms n. However, we did assume that the number of firms
is large. Thus, (3.2) can be understood as the limit formula when n is
large. The following properties of PWLs are easily proven:
Proposition 8. i) PWLs is decreasing in δ.
ii) limδ→1PWLs=0 and limδ→0PWLs=1.
iii) PWLs is increasing in r.
iv) limr→1PWLs=1 and limr→0PWLs=0.
The explanation of ii) is that when δ is close to one (resp. zero), the
products are close to being homogeneous (resp. very differentiated),
and welfare losses are small (resp. large); see formula (3.1). The
explanation of iii) is that as r increases (resp. decreases), the gap
between the optimal and the equilibrium output increases (resp.
decreases); see formulae (3.4) and (3.5). It follows from ii) and iv)
that it is possible to have a market where the elasticity of demand is
close to infinity (i.e., δ is close to 1) and PWL is as close to 1 as we
wish.10 In brief, elasticity of demand is only a partial measure of PWL
in this model.
Let us relate PWLs to the observable variables listed in Definition 4
of the previous section. The FOC of profit maximization imply that
 = p
p c
, so in this framework, as in the Bertrand case in the previous
section, knowledge of the elasticity of demand is of no help. We will
assume that c ln n + ln pð Þ b p ln n; this condition ensures that rb1.
In our construction, the function ProductLog (t) will play a
prominent role. This function, called Lambert's W function, gives the
solution for w in t=wew and has the following properties:11
i) ProductLog (t) ∈R for t ∈ 1
e
;∞
h 
;
ii) ProductLog 1e
 
= 1;
iii) limδ→∞ProductLog (t)=∞;
iv) ProductLog (0)=0;
v) ProductLog (t) is increasing in t∈ 1e ;∞Þ
	
;
vi) eaProductLog(t)(ProductLog (t))a=ta.
Now we arrive at the main result of this section:
Proposition 9. Given an observation p; xi; c;nf g there is a CES market
δ; r; c;nf g such that p; xið Þ is an equilibrium for this market, and
PWLs 1
c
p
  1
1 r
p
c
r
1 r
where r =
ProductLog npxi
p
c lnn + ln xi
  
p
c lnn + ln xi
ð3:6Þ
Proof. Let δ and r be such that
rδ
cn1
r
δ
 ! 1
1 r
= xi and
c
δ
= p
The previous equations yield
δ =
c
p
and r =
ProductLog npxi
p
c ln n + ln xi
  
p
c ln n + ln xi
It is straightforward to check that 0bδb1 and 0b rb1 (using the
condition cp b
ln n
ln n + ln p). Then by construction the CES market
δ; r; c;nf g yields an equilibrium where p⁎=p and xi⁎=xi. Plugging δ
and r into (3.2), we get the formula for PWLs as a function of an
observation p; xi; c;nf g. □
An important consequence of Proposition 9 is that, given an
observation, there is a unique value of PWLs. In this case, the number
of parameters to be “recovered” is equal to the number of data.
Next, we analyze the properties of PWLs in (3.6):
Proposition 10. The percentage of welfare losses in the CES model is
such that
i) limnY∞PWLs = 1 cp
  1
1 c
p
p
c
+ 1
 
.
ii) limc
p
Y1PWL
s = 0.
iii) limc
p
Y1 limnY∞PWL
sð Þ = 1 2
e
g0:2642.
Note that when a finite number of firms are pricing at the marginal
cost, PWLs is close to zero. When an infinite number of firms are
pricing at the marginal cost, however, PWLs is quite high. In fact, it
could be argued that formula i) above should be used since we
assumed that nwas large. In this case, PWLs is decreasing in the price
marginal cost margin, p c
p
.12
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relationship between observable
variables and welfare losses, taking the behavior of firms as given.13
Our main message is positive in that relating welfare losses to
observables is a feasible endeavor in the models considered in this
paper.14 But there is an important caveat: the calculus of welfare losses
depends on the forms of demand and costs not only at the equilibrium
point, but at all points in the domain of these functions. This contrasts
with the typical linearization around the equilibrium where a linear
form is supposed to represent the characteristics of a general function
around the equilibrium point. It is clear that welfare losses depend in a
fundamental way on the functional forms, so this issue cannot be
dodged. Thus, one can interpret our results by saying that they show
welfare consequences of assumptions that are often made about the
functional forms of demand and costs.
We end this paper by giving some hints as to how data and
elasticities may help us to discriminate among the models. The clearest
case is a Bertrand equilibrium.Anecessary condition for this equilibrium
to be supported by the data is that for all i, pi=ε(pi ci) (irrespective of
whether the market is linear). If the elasticity of demand cannot be
estimated, Proposition 2 says that any observation can be interpreted as
a Bertrand equilibrium. The case for the CES model relies on two
assumptions. On the one hand, the elasticity of demand must be
constant. On the other hand, the cross elasticity of demand (calculated
as 1Api
Axj
xj
pi
) should be very high (it amounts to nr δ). Finally, let us consider
the Cournot equilibrium. Let nu Api
Axi
xi
pi
be the elasticity of the
inverse demand function. From the FOC of profit maximization, we
have ξpi=pi ci. The elasticity ξ can be obtained by inverting the
system of demand functions. For instance, in the symmetric case with
n = 2; n = ee2 ρ2, which when plugged into the FOC yields
pi ci
pi
=
e
e2 ρ2. If markups, demand and cross elasticities can be estimated, they
must obey the previous equation in a Cournot equilibrium.
References
Amir, R., Jin, J.Y., 2001. Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability,
complementarity and concavity. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19,
303–317.
10 Even if δ= r, limδ→1PWLs=0.2642, a large number.
11 See Weisstein (1999).
12 When n is not large, we have an example, available upon request, showing that
PWL is not monotonic in the price–marginal cost margin.
13 See Sutton (1998) for an approach where the only source of variation between
firms is the degree of competitiveness.
14 The models presented in this paper have been selected for their impact in the
profession. Thus, the papers by Dixit, Singh and Vives and Spence obtained in the
aggregate nearly 1800 citations in Google Scholar.
8
Anderson, S.P., Renault, R., 2003. Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
Journal of Economic Theory 113, 253–264.
Cable, J., Carruth, A., Dixit, A., 1994. In: Cable, J. (Ed.), Oligopoly and Welfare in Current
Issues in Industrial Economics. InMacmillan Press, London.
Coate, M., 2005. Empirical analysis of merger enforcement under the 1992 Merger
Guidelines. Review of Industrial Organization 27 (4), 279–301.
Corchón, L.C., 2008. Welfare losses under Cournot competition. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 26, 1120–1131.
Corchón, L.C., Zudenkova, G., 2008. Computing Welfare Losses from Data under
Imperfect Competition with Heterogeneous Goods. UC3M WP 08-26 (16).
Cowling, K., Mueller, D.C., 1978. The social costs of monopoly power. Economic Journal
88, 727–748.
Daughety, A.,1990. Beneficial concentration. American Economic Review 80,1231–1237.
Dixit, A.K., 1979. Amodel of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. Bell Journal of
Economics 10, 20–32.
Dixit, A.K., Stiglitz, J.E., 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity.
American Economic Review 67, 297–308.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990. Horizontal merger: an equilibrium analysis. American
Economic Review 80, 107–126.
Formby, J., Layson, S., 1982. Allocative inefficiency and measures of market power.
Atlantic Economic Journal 10 (4), 67–70.
Häckner, J., 2000. A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies.
Journal of Economic Theory 93 (2), 233–239.
Harberger, A.C., 1954. Monopoly and resource allocation. American Economic Review:
Papers and Proceedings 44, 77–87.
Hsu, J., Wang, X.H., 2005. On welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition in
differentiated oligopolies. Review of Industrial Organization 27 (2), 185–191.
Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., 2005. Efficiency loss in Cournot games. Mimeo, Jan. 28.
Lahiri, S., Ono, Y., 1988. Helping minor firms reduces welfare. Economic Journal 98,
1199–1202.
Lerner, A., 1934. The concept of monopoly and the measurement of monopoly power.
Review of Economic Studies 1 (3), 157–175.
McHardy, J.P., 2000. Miscalculations of monopoly and oligopoly welfare losses with
linear demand. Hull Economic Research Papers. November.
Singh, N., Vives, X., 1984. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated oligopoly.
Rand Journal of Economics 15, 546–554.
Spence, M., 1976. Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition. Review
of Economic Studies 43, 217–235.
Stigler, G.J., 1949. Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect in Five Lectures on Economic
Problems. Longmans, Green and Co, London.
Sutton, J., 1998. Technology and Market Structure. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Weisstein, E.W., 1999. The CRC Concise Encyclopedia of Mathematics. CRC Press LLC.
9
